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dropbear: relax path permission checks for authorized keys

Check permissions of correct folder for certificates too.

Fixes: bbe4d6ddb2 ("dropbear: bump to 2025.88")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/19611
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This commit is contained in:
Konstantin Demin 2025-07-31 16:24:09 +03:00 committed by Hauke Mehrtens
parent 27baa3c731
commit 68e5f46899
3 changed files with 79 additions and 33 deletions

View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=dropbear
PKG_VERSION:=2025.88
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \

View file

@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
Author: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
From 5cc0127000db5f7567b54d0495fb91a8e452fe09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 May 2025 22:39:35 +0300
Subject: Fix proxycmd without netcat
Fixes commit e5a0ef27c227 "Execute multihop commands directly, no shell"
fixes e5a0ef27c2 "Execute multihop commands directly, no shell"
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Forwarded: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/363
---
src/cli-main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/cli-main.c b/src/cli-main.c
index 2fafa88900..0a052a3512 100644
--- a/src/cli-main.c
+++ b/src/cli-main.c
@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ index 2fafa88900..0a052a3512 100644
cli_proxy_cmd(&sock_in, &sock_out, &proxy_cmd_pid);
if (signal(SIGINT, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
signal(SIGTERM, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
@@ -110,11 +114,13 @@ static void shell_proxy_cmd(const void *user_data_cmd) {
@@ -110,11 +114,13 @@ static void shell_proxy_cmd(const void *
dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cmd);
}
@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ index 2fafa88900..0a052a3512 100644
static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
char * cmd_arg = NULL;
@@ -145,9 +151,11 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
@@ -145,9 +151,11 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in,
cmd_arg = m_malloc(shell_cmdlen);
snprintf(cmd_arg, shell_cmdlen, "exec %s", cli_opts.proxycmd);
exec_fn = shell_proxy_cmd;
@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ index 2fafa88900..0a052a3512 100644
}
ret = spawn_command(exec_fn, cmd_arg, sock_out, sock_in, NULL, pid_out);
@@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
@@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in,
cleanup:
m_free(cli_opts.proxycmd);
m_free(cmd_arg);

View file

@ -1,29 +1,55 @@
src/svr-authpubkey.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/src/svr-authpubkey.c
+++ b/src/svr-authpubkey.c
@@ -435,20 +435,45 @@ out:
/* Returns the full path to the user's authorized_keys file in an
* allocated string which caller must free. */
static char *authorized_keys_filepath() {
+ static const char * const global_authkeys_dir = "/etc/dropbear";
+ /* strlen(global_authkeys_dir) */
+ #define n_global_authkeys_dir 13
+ static const char * const authkeys_file = "authorized_keys";
+ /* strlen(authkeys_file) */
+ #define n_authkeys_file 15
@@ -79,6 +79,39 @@ static void send_msg_userauth_pk_ok(cons
const unsigned char* keyblob, unsigned int keybloblen);
static int checkfileperm(char * filename);
+static const char * const global_authkeys_dir = "/etc/dropbear";
+/* strlen(global_authkeys_dir) */
+#define n_global_authkeys_dir 13
+static const char * const authkeys_file = "authorized_keys";
+/* strlen(authkeys_file) */
+#define n_authkeys_file 15
+
+/* OpenWrt-specific:
+ use OpenWrt' global authorized keys directory if:
+ 1. logging as uid 0 (typically root).
+ 2. "svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir" is set to default i.e. no "-D" option was specified
+ OR
+ "-D" option is specified as homedir-relative path ("~" or "~/...")
+ OR
+ "-D" option is specified as "/etc/dropbear".
+ */
+static int is_openwrt_defaults(void) {
+ if (ses.authstate.pw_uid != 0) return 0;
+ switch (svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir[0]) {
+ case '~':
+ switch (svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir[1]) {
+ case 0:
+ return 1;
+ case '/':
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '/':
+ return (strcmp(svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir, global_authkeys_dir) == 0);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
* appropriate */
void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
@@ -439,16 +472,22 @@ out:
static char *authorized_keys_filepath() {
size_t len = 0;
char *pathname = NULL, *dir = NULL;
- const char *filename = "authorized_keys";
+
+ /* OpenWrt-specific:
+ use OpenWrt' global authorized keys directory if:
+ 1. logging as uid 0 (typically root)
+ 2. "svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir" is set to default i.e. no "-D" option was specified
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ if (ses.authstate.pw_uid != 0) break;
+ if (svr_opts.authorized_keys_dir[0] == '/') break;
+
+ if (is_openwrt_defaults()) {
+ len = n_global_authkeys_dir + n_authkeys_file + 2;
+ pathname = m_malloc(len);
+ snprintf(pathname, len, "%s/%s", global_authkeys_dir, authkeys_file);
@ -42,10 +68,29 @@
+ snprintf(pathname, len, "%s/%s", dir, authkeys_file);
m_free(dir);
return pathname;
+
+ /* not needed anymore */
+ #undef n_global_authkeys_dir
+ #undef n_authkeys_file
}
@@ -549,11 +588,23 @@ out:
* When this path is inside the user's home dir it checks up to and including
* the home dir, otherwise it checks every path component. */
static int checkpubkeyperms() {
- char *path = authorized_keys_filepath(), *sep = NULL;
+ char *path = NULL, *sep = NULL;
int ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
/* Checks whether a specified publickey (and associated algorithm) is an
+ if (is_openwrt_defaults()) {
+ TRACE(("enter checkpubkeyperms/openwrt"))
+ if (checkfileperm(global_authkeys_dir) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
+ TRACE(("checkpubkeyperms: bad perm on %s", global_authkeys_dir))
+ ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+ }
+ TRACE(("leave checkpubkeyperms/openwrt"))
+ return ret;
+ }
+
TRACE(("enter checkpubkeyperms"))
+ path = authorized_keys_filepath();
+
/* Walk back up path checking permissions, stopping at either homedir,
* or root if the path is outside of the homedir. */
while ((sep = strrchr(path, '/')) != NULL) {